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Abstract
The paper looks at the existence, nature and form of intrahousehold and in-
terhousehold externalities of education on productivity, e¢ ciency, and production
uncertainty of maize in rural Malawi. Data from the Third Integrated Household
Survey are used. I nd statistically and economically signicant positive intra-
household and interhousehold externalities of education on both productivity, e¢ -
ciency, and production uncertainty, and that the intrahousehold externality e¤ects
are larger than interhousehold externality e¤ects. Community level schooling is
found to substitute for household level schooling in the sense that farmers who reside
in households where members are not educated have relatively higher production,
and lower production uncertainty on account of living in communities where some
inhabitants are educated. The paper also nds that the intrahousehold and inter-
household externality e¤ects are more pronounced for the least e¢ cient farmers,
and that they are monotonic, and largest when schooling is relatively low.
Keywords: intrahousehold; interhousehold;externality; Malawi
1 Introduction
In the face of limited public resources, the measurement of returns to education is critical
to public policy makers as they decide on how much public funds to direct into education
versus other equally important sectors such as health or infrastructure. The returns to
education have been analyzed for numerous countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. A number of
studies have looked at labour market returns to education (e.g. Siphambe, 2000; Schultz,
2004). A consistent nding by these studies is that additional years of schooling are
benecial in the sense that there is a positive relationship between earnings and education.
Furthermore, evidence on the dispersion of labour market returns across education levels
partly explain the drive towards the expansion of primary education over other levels of
education in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. World Bank, 1995) This emphasis on primary
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education is in part motivated by ndings that returns to education are concave i.e.
returns to education are highest at lower levels (Psacharopoulos, 1994; Psacharopoulos &
Patrinos, 2002).
Recent literature however calls into question this nding. Söderbom et al (2006) nds
that returns to education are convex; which implies that the marginal returns to education
are lowest for the individuals with the least education. Hence, the nature of the shape of
the earnings function is important for understanding what form of education expansion
policies to implement. As has however been noted by Fields (2011), the developing world is
characterised by low levels of wage employment. Moreover, the majority of the population
in developing countries rely on agriculture for their livelihood. Consequently, knowledge of
labour market returns to education is of limited use as a guide to educational investment in
such agrarian societies (Asadullah & Rahman, 2009). In an agrarian environment, returns
to education in agriculture are probably more relevant for education policies which seek
to expand education.
The literature on returns to education in agricultural production in Sub-Saharan
Africa can be put into two broad categories. The rst group of studies focuses on the
e¤ect of an individual farmers education on productivity or e¢ ciency. These studies
either use cross-sectional data (e.g. Seyoum et al., 1998) or panel data (e.g. Sherlund
et al., 2002). A common nding in these studies is that farmers with greater years of
formal schooling are more productive or technically e¢ cient. The other group of studies
looks at external returns to education. This set of studies accounts for fact that the
level of schooling within and between households may act like a public good in that
the literate household or community members may confer a positive externality on the
illiterate members in the household or community (Basu & Foster, 1998; Basu et al.,
2002). The presence of these positive within and between household external returns to
education imply that an individuals education has far larger benets which go beyond
the individual.
The extent of schooling within a household and a community can have a positive
externality e¤ect on agricultural productivity and technical e¢ ciency1. Such education
externalities might arise for instance as uneducated farmers learn from the superior pro-
duction choices of educated farmers in the community. The education externality could
also arise when educated farmers are early innovators and are copied by those with less
schooling (Knight et al., 2003; Weir & Knight, 2004). External benets of education
1In this study, technical ine¢ ciency is dened as the deviation between observed and maximum feasible
output for given production technology and observed input use i.e. a production frontier. Farmers can
either operate on the frontier if they are technically e¢ cient or beneath the frontier if they are not
technically e¢ cient. Productivity on the other hand refers to the relationship between observed output
and observed input use for a given level of production technology. Here farms are assumed to be operating
at full technical e¢ cient levels and thus do not purposely waste resources. Any resource wastage is
attributable to ignorance.
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may also accrue within households and communities by one person taking decisions on
behalf of another person (Dreze & Saran, 1995). All this means that uneducated farmers
who live in households or communities where some members are educated-the so-called
proximate illiterates (Basu & Foster, 1998)- are a priori expected to be more productive
and technically e¢ cient than their counterparts who stay in households or communities
where nobody is educated-the so-called isolated illiterates (Basu & Foster, 1998).
While the literature on internal or individual returns to education in the developing
world is voluminous, a few household level studies have found evidence of education exter-
nalities on agricultural productivity and technical e¢ ciency. Here there are two strands
of literature on the presence of education externalities in agriculture; one strand examines
the role of education externalities on productivity only, while another strand looks at the
role of education externalities on both productivity and technical e¢ ciency. Appleton
& Balihuta (1996) study the relationship between the mean level of education of other
farmers in the same enumeration area on agricultural production in Uganda. They nd
a statistically signicant and substantial externality e¤ect of education. Weir & Knight
(2007) investigate the externality e¤ect of site level education on productivity and ef-
ciency using Ethiopian data. They nd a statistically signicant externality e¤ect of
education on productivity, but they fail to nd a signicant e¤ect on technical e¢ ciency.
Asadullah & Rahman (2009) examine the role of within household and neighbourhood ed-
ucation on rice productivity and technical e¢ ciency in Bangladesh. They fail to nd any
evidence of an external benet of schooling, however they nd that household education
raises rice productivity, and reduces technical ine¢ ciencies. Gille (2012) investigates the
presence of inter-household education externalities on agricultural productivity in rural
India, and nds that education spillovers do exist; specically, holding other things con-
stant, one additional year in the mean level of education of neighbors increases households
farm production by 2%.
This paper uses Malawian data on smallholder maize production in rural areas to
make ve contributions to the literature on productivity and technical e¢ ciency in agri-
culture, and within and between household education externalities. First, the existing
literature has focused on the relationship between education externalities and produc-
tivity and technical e¢ ciency but has provided no evidence of the relationship between
education externalities and agricultural production uncertainty or risk. Crop production
faces inherent uncertainty caused by variations in weather, disease, insects, and other bio-
logical pests. It is quite plausible to expect that farming households where some members
have high levels of schooling or reside in communities with high levels of schooling would
be better able to cope with production uncertainty and risk through for example learning
or copying good crop husbandry from the educated. Here, I assess how education within
and between households a¤ects production uncertainty and the relative magnitudes of the
two externalities. Second, the existing studies on e¢ ciency have focused on the directions
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of the externality e¤ect on technical ine¢ ciency while overlooking the magnitudes of the
partial e¤ects. As noted by Liu & Myers (2009), this makes it impossible to quantify the
magnitude of the intrahousehold and interhousehold externality e¤ects, and to compare
the sizes of the two e¤ects. Knowledge of which e¤ect is larger can be useful for policy
in the sense that it makes it possible to determine which type of policy intervention will
have the largest impact on ine¢ ciency and uncertainty.
A few studies on production and technical e¢ ciency (e.g. Weir & Knight, 2004;
Asadullah & Rahman, 2009) measure education externalities in an integrated manner
where two distinct roles are assigned to schooling: one as an input in the production
function, and this represents a direct e¤ect, and another as a factor narrowing the tech-
nology gap in the ine¢ ciency e¤ect function, and this captures an indirect externality
e¤ect. However, these studies measure education externalities on production and e¢ -
ciency separately. To the best of my knowledge, there is no study which has attempted to
measure the total e¤ect of education externalities. By simply focusing on direct or indirect
channels to measure education externalities, the existing papers could be mismeasuring
the magnitudes of the externalities.The third contribution that this paper makes to the
literature is that it ensures that education externalities are accurately measured through
the measurement of the total e¤ect of education.
The fourth contribution relates to an understanding of who benets more from ed-
ucation externalities. The existing literature assumes that the education externality at
the village or community level is the same for all households regardless of the extent of
schooling within a household. One would expect the inter-household education exter-
nality to be relatively more pronounced for those households with little or no schooling
than for those with high levels of schooling. Pooling all households together provides a
misleading picture of the size of the external benets provided by education on technical
e¢ ciency and production uncertainty. Related to this, previous studies have not examined
how the education externality e¤ect varies with di¤erent levels of e¢ ciency. The implicit
assumption made in the literature is that the intrahousehold and interhousehold exter-
nality is the same for the most e¢ cient farmers and the least e¢ cient ones. And again
by lumping all farmers together, the existing literature does not help in understanding
who benets more from education spillovers. A nal contribution of this paper is that it
assesses whether or not the externality e¤ect of education on both technical e¢ ciency and
production uncertainty is positive or negative for all levels of schooling. Previous studies
implicitly assume that the intrahousehold and interhousehold externality is constant over
all levels of education. This is obviously quite restricted as it ignores the possibility that
the externality e¤ect can be non-monotonic: the returns to education can be increasing
at low levels of education followed by diminishing returns at high levels of education. A
failure to capture non-monotonicity can render estimation results imprecise at best and
misleading at worst (Wang, 2002). By allowing a more exible externality e¤ect, the
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results can be more informative for the purpose of policy analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a maize
production and education prole for Malawi. In Section 3 the methodology is presented,
and the variables and data used are discussed. This is followed by the empirical results
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Maize Production and Education in Malawi
Malawis economy is agrobased, with the agricultural sector accounting for about 30%
of GDP over the period 2005-2011. Over the same period, the agriculture sector was by
far Malawis most important contributor to economic growth, with a contribution of 34.2
percent to overall GDP growth. Agriculture is however more important than revealed
by its contribution to GDP. Over the same period, the agriculture sector was the main
sector of employment with about 86% of all employed persons working in this sector
(NSO, 2012a). Levels of regular wage employment suggest that wage employment is a
small part of the labour market in Malawi. The rest are either in unpaid family work or
in self-employment. Overall wage employment increased from 9.3% of the labour force
in 2004 to 13.4% in 2011 (NSO, 2012b). Maize is a staple food in Malawi, and accounts
for more than two-thirds of caloric availability (Ecker & Qaim, 2011). As a result of
low food diversication, national food security continues to be dened in terms of access
to maize. Smallholder agriculture is dominated by maize production, for instance, NSO
(2012b) found that 85% of households in Malawi cultivated maize (69% in urban areas,
and 88% in rural areas). Further to that, rain-fed smallholder maize production accounts
for around one quarter of agricultural GDP. Hence, the relatively large size of the maize
sector means that increases in maize production lead to signicant and strong increases
in overall agricultural GDP growth.
Increased agricultural productivity is one of the key focus areas of the Malawi Growth
and Development Strategy (MGDS), an overarching medium term national development
framework. This priority has seen the formulation of a number of sectoral strategy doc-
uments which include: a National Agricultural Policy (NAP) for the period 2010-2016,
and an Agricultural Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp). The most signicant productivity
enhancing policy intervention in recent years has been the Farm Input Subsidy Program
(FISP), which provides low-cost fertilizer and improved maize seeds to poor smallholders.
Implementation of the FISP started in the 2005/6 cropping season, and in the 2012/13
nancial year, the programme represented 4.6% of GDP or 11.5% of the total national
budget (World Bank, 2013).
To get a sense of howmaize productivity has evolved before and after this major policy
intervention, Figure 1 shows maize production in millions of tonnes, area cultivated in
hectares, and maize yield per hectare for the cropping period 1999/2000-2011/12. The
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land area dedicated to the growing of maize has remained fairly unchanged, however, it is
evident that the maize yield per hectare rose sharply following the subsidy. For instance,
the season preceding the subsidy (2004/05), the yield per hectare was 0.8 metric tonnes
per hectare, and for the cropping season 2006/07, the yield per hectare was 2.7 metric
tonnes per hectare. It should be pointed out that the bumper harvests following FISP
coincided with good rains. There is therefore an obvious attribution problem here which
has not yet been resolved, however, it is reasonable to assume that the FISP played a part
in boosting maize yields. Although, the maize productivity has risen to an average yield
per hectare of 2.1 between 2006 and 2012, it is still signicantly lower when compared
with other countries. For instance, the average maize yield over the same period was 4.1
metric tonnes per hectare, and 9.3 metric tonnes per hectare for South Africa and the
United States of America respectively.
A number of studies have cast some doubts over the reported increase in maize pro-
duction which is attributable to FISP. First, Dorward et al. (2008) nd that maize
production gures computed using the Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) which was
done in 2004/5 di¤er signicantly from those based on o¢ cial crop estimates . Second, the
very high national production gures are not consistent with very high domestic prices
from early in 2008 through much of 2009 (Chirwa & Dorward, 2013). Finally, it has
been argued that the production gures do not take into account the possibility of FISP
crowding out commercial fertilizer use; the crowding out e¤ect is estimated to be around
20-30%. This in turn would entail lower net fertilizer use (Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2011),
and hence lower maize production. Despite these doubts about the magnitude of the
impact of FISP, Ricker-Gilbert (2014) has shown that FISP had equilibrium e¤ects in
that non-recipients of subsidized fertilizer may have gained some small spillover benet
from the subsidy program in the form of slightly higher agricultural wage rates. Chirwa
& Dorward, 2013 a survey of other positive impacts of the subsidy which include: in-
creased subjective wellbeing, improvements in food security, improvements in primary
school enrolment, health and nutrition among others. It should however be pointed out
that impact evaluations of agriculture input subsidies face a number of conceptual and
empirical challenges which means that the impact results must be viewed with strong
caveats ( see Ricker-Gilbert et. al. (2013) for a detailed discussion of these challenges).
Despite recognizing the problem of low maize productivity, the MGDS does not explic-
itly identify education and its potential spillovers as one of the factors that could improve
maize productivity in Malawi. The relevant strategies to increase maize productivity in
the MGDS include: strengthening linkages of farmers to input and output market; pro-
moting appropriate technology development, transfer and absorption; improving access
to inputs; and promoting contract farming arrangements (GOM, 2011). By examining
the nature of intrahousehold and interhousehold education spillovers in maize production,
this paper provides useful insights into the relationship between maize productivity and
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education. The formal education system in Malawi is composed of three levels namely;
primary, secondary, and post secondary. Education at all three levels is not compulsory.
The Malawi government cognizant of the crucial role that human capital accumulation
and development plays in fostering economic growth among other benets introduced free
primary education (FPE) in 1994. With FPE parents no longer have to pay fees for the
primary education of children who attend government schools. Private primary schools
however continue to charge fees. Increasing access to primary and secondary education is
one of the main priority areas identied in the MGDS.
To assess if there have been improvements in education indicators in Malawi between
2004 and 2011, Table 1 reports the levels and trends in: a) adult literacy rates, b) primary
enrolment rates, and c) primary school dropout rates. The proportion of the population
aged 15 years and over that is literate increased marginally from 64% in 2004 to 65%
in 2011; suggesting that there has been very little progress in improving adult literacy
in Malawi. The proportion of adults who can read and write is higher in urban areas
than in rural areas. Furthermore, the literacy rate for rural areas has remained almost
unchanged while it has increased by about 3 percentage points between 2004 and 2011. For
both years, signicant progress has been made in increasing primary net enrolment rates.
However, primary enrolment levels in rural areas are lower than those for urban areas.
The internal e¢ ciency of primary school system as measured by the dropout rate seems
to have improved over the ve year period. These statistics thus point to two milestones
that Malawi has achieved; increased primary enrolment, and improved internal e¢ ciency.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 A Stochastic Production Frontier with Non-Monotonicity
To analyse whether there are education externalities on maize productivity, e¢ ciency, and
production uncertainty, I modify a stochastic frontier model developed by Wang (2002).
The modication ensures that the stochastic production function is non-neutral, and this
allows for the measurement of the indirect (e¢ ciency based) and direct (production based)
intrahousehold and interhousehold education externality e¤ects on maize production. Ac-
counting for the presence of both indirect and direct externality e¤ects ensures that the
externalities are accurately measured. The non-neutral production function adopted in
this paper follows Binar et al. (2007), which in turn is a simplied version of Huang and
Lius (1994) non-neutral frontier model. The advantage of the Wang (2002) model is that
it nests two modeling approaches as special cases. The rst approach focuses on factors
a¤ecting the mean of technical ine¢ ciency (see for example Kumbhakar et al. (1991),
Huang & Liu (1994), and Battese & Coelli (1995)). The other approach deals with fac-
tors that inuence production uncertainty i.e. the variance of the ine¢ ciency e¤ect (see
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for example Caudill et al. (1995), and Hadri (1999)). Using the Wang (2002) model, this
paper is therefore able to investigate the presence of externality e¤ects of schooling on
both e¢ ciency and production uncertainty.
The production structure for maize eld i belonging to household j which is in
community l is specied using a single-output, multi-input Translog stochastic production
frontier given as follows
ln qijl = ln f(x; s)  uijl
= 0 +
5X
k=1
k lnxijlk +
1
2
5X
f=1
5X
k=1
fk lnxijlf lnxijlk
+sjl +
1
2
5X
k=1
k lnxijlksjl + ~sl +
1
2
5X
k=1
k lnxijlk~sl (1)
+
2X
m=1
mDijlm + E + vijl   uijl
vijl  N
 
0; 2v

(2)
uijl  N+

ijl; 
2
uijl

(3)
ijl = wsjl + b~sl + zijl (4)
2uijl = exp (wsjl + b~sl + zijl) (5)
where; qijl is rainfed maize output measured in kilograms, 0 is an intercept, k
(l = 1:::5) are output elasticities with respect to inputs xijl. There are ve inputs; land
measured in acres, own and hired labour measured in man days, capital measured as the
total monetary value in Malawi Kwacha of farm implements (hoes, slashers, axes, oxcarts,
oxploughs) owned by a household, seed measured in kilograms, organic and inorganic
fertilizer measured in kilograms. sjl and ~sl are the average years of schooling in a household
and in a community respectively; they capture the intrahousehold and interhousehold
externality of education on maize production.  and  are the corresponding coe¢ cents
for the two variables. The empirical analysis also uses the maximum years of schooling
in a household as a robustness check. lnxijlksjl and lnxijlksl are schooling-production
input interaction variables; which measure whether or not education externalities are
competitive or complementary with production inputs. k and k are the corresponding
coe¢ cent vectors of the interaction variables. The inclusion of schooling-production input
interaction variables is consistent with other studies (e.g. Foltz et al., 2012) which nd
for example that education a¤ects the returns to fertilizer.
I include two dummies (Dijlm) to distinguish three soil quality types, sandy, clay,
sandy-clay (the base category) among elds, and m(m = 1::2) are the associated coe¢ -
cients. E is a vector of agro-ecological zone dummies which capture zone level xed e¤ects,
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and  is the corresponding coe¢ cient vector. There are eight rural agro-ecological zones.
Agro-ecological zones control for di¤erences in climate and market access conditions in an
area2. Soil quality and agro-ecological zones control for environmental conditions. Sher-
lund et al. (2002) show that failure to control for environmental conditions may lead to
omitted variable bias in the estimated parameters of the production frontier, and biased
estimated coe¢ cients in the technical ine¢ ciency model.
vijl is a two sided random variable representing random variations in the economic
environment facing production units, reecting luck, weather, measurement errors, and
omitted variables from the model. uijl is a technical ine¢ ciency e¤ect which is a non-
negative truncation of a normal random variable. It represents deviations from potential
output that reect ine¢ ciency such as farm-specic knowledge, the will and skills of farm-
ers, and other disruptions to production. The notation "+" means that the underlying
distribution is truncated from below at zero so that realized values of the random variable
uijl are positive. It is assumed that vijl and uijl are independent of each other.
The ine¢ ciency model (equation (4)) captures how the average years of schooling in a
household sjl and in a community ~sl, and other exogenous farm-specic control variables,
zijl; inuence ine¢ ciency. Similarly, the production uncertainty model (equation(5)) rep-
resents the relationship between production uncertainty- as measured by the variance of
the ine¢ ciency e¤ects- and the household and community level average years of schooling,
and other control variables. In both models, average years of schooling at the household
and community levels, respectively capture the intrahousehold and interhousehold exter-
nality of education. Just like before, the robustness of the empirical results is assessed by
alternatively employing the maximum years of schooling in a household and in a commu-
nity.
The production uncertainty model presents a more technical advantage over a model
which assumes that the ine¢ ciencies are homoscedastic. Explicitly modeling the exoge-
nous factors ensures that the estimation of the production frontier model and the level of
technical ine¢ ciency is not biased, hence, policy conclusions are premised on valid results
(e.g. Caudill et al. 1995; Hadri,1999). w; b; w and b are coe¢ cients of schooling on ef-
ciency and production uncertainty, and  and  are the corresponding coe¢ cient vectors
of the control variables. The ine¢ ciency and production uncertainty models and the sto-
chastic frontier production function in equation (1) are estimated jointly using maximum
likelihood estimation to achieve both e¢ ciency and consistency. Farm-specic estimates of
technical e¢ ciency are obtained via the conditional expectation E[exp(uijljvijl)] (Battese
& Coelli, 1988).
I use marginal e¤ects to test for the presence of externality e¤ects of schooling on
ine¢ ciency and uncertainty. To avoid notational clutter, let W be a vector of covariates
2Alternatively, community level xed e¤ects can be used here, however, since there are 624 communities
after data cleaning, this means estimating too many xed e¤ects, and a loss of degrees of freedom.
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in the production function, and O be a vector of covariates in the ine¢ ciency and the pro-
duction uncertainty models. The total externality e¤ect of each one of the two schooling
variables on the conditional expectation E (ln qijljW;O) can be decomposed into a direct
e¤ect, which measures the e¤ect of schooling on actual output, and indirect e¤ect which
represents the e¤ect of schooling on the gap between potential and actual output (i.e.
ine¢ ciency). For the between household average schooling, the two e¤ects are given as
follows
@E (ln qijljW;O)
@~sl
=
@ ln f(W )
@~sl
  @E (uijljO)
@~sl
(6)
where
@ ln f(W )
@~sl
=  +
1
2
5X
k=1
k lnxijl (7)
is a direct externality e¤ect. It has two components: the rst component captures the
own contribution of schooling to farm output while the second component represents an
interaction between schooling and inputs. A positive (negative) sign for the parameter k
indicates that schooling increases (decreases) the e¤ectiveness of the inputs on production.
The indirect externality e¤ect of schooling is given as (Wang, 2002; Liu and Myers,
2009)
@E (uijljO)
@~sl
= b
 
1  A1A2   A22

+
bu
2

(1 + A1)A2 + A1A
2
2

(8)
where A1 =
uij
uij
and A2 =
(A1)
(A1)
.  and  are the probability and cumulative den-
sity functions of a standard normal distribution respectively. Thus, a test of the hy-
pothesis that
@E(ln qijljW;O)
@~sl
= 0; amounts to testing that there are no externality ef-
fects of schooling at the community level on e¢ ciency. The sign and magnitude of
@E(ln qijljW;O)
@~sl
respectively indicate the direction and size of the externality e¤ect. A
positive (negative) externality e¤ect of community level schooling on e¢ ciency holds if
@E(ln qijljW;O)
@~sl
> 0

@E(ln qijljW;O)
@~sl
< 0

: The total e¤ect is also the semi-elasticity of output
with respect to ~sl:
If the indirect e¤ect is zero, then the externality e¤ect of schooling on farm perfor-
mance works through the direct e¤ect only. If on the other hand, the direct e¤ect is zero,
then the externality e¤ect of schooling is based on the technical ine¢ ciency model only.
The presence of both direct and indirect channels through which education externalities
may operate point to a potential for mismeasuring the magnitudes of the externalities.
The positive education externalities would be underestimated if: a) the direct e¤ect is
larger than the indirect e¤ect, but the schooling variables are included in the techni-
cal e¢ ciency model only, or b) the indirect e¤ect is larger than the direct e¤ect, but the
schooling variables are included in the production model only. The education externalities
would be overestimated if the reverse holds.
Similarly, the marginal e¤ect of ~sl on the conditional variance of the ine¢ ciency term
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uijl is expressed as (Wang, 2002; Liu & Myers, 2009)
@V (uijljO)
@~sl
=
b
2u
A2
 
m21  m2

(9)
+b
2
u

1  1
2
A2

A1 + A
3
1 +
 
2 + 3A21

A2 + 2A1A
2
2

where m1 = u (A1A2 + A2) and m2 = 2u (1  A1A2   A22) is the mean and variance
of uijl respectively. To test whether or not community level schooling a¤ects produc-
tion uncertainty involves testing the hypothesis that
@V (uijljO)
@~sl
= 0. A positive (nega-
tive) externality e¤ect of community level schooling on production uncertainty holds if
@V (uijljO)
@~sl
> 0

@V (uijljO)
@~sl
< 0

: Since
@V (uijljO)
@~sl
=
@V (ln qij jO)
@~sl
; the marginal e¤ect is also
the semi-elasticity of the output variance with respect to ~sl:The marginal e¤ects for the
intrahousehold externality of education,
@E(ln qijljW;O)
@sjl
and
@V (uijljO)
@sjl
are analogously de-
rived.
To assess how the community education externality e¤ect on e¢ ciency and produc-
tion uncertainty varies with household average years of schooling, I use equations (6)
and (9) to calculate total e¤ects of community level education for di¤erent quartiles of
household average years of schooling. Similarly, the heterogenous e¤ect of community
and household level schooling on di¤erent levels of e¢ ciency is captured by calculating the
corresponding marginal e¤ects for di¤erent quartiles of estimated e¢ ciency. As has been
shown by Wang (2002), equations (8) and (9) accommodate non-monotonic e¤ects of ~sl;
implying that the total e¤ects can be both positive and negative in the sample, and their
signs do not necessarily coincide with the signs of either of the slope coe¢ cients b and
b. The ability to capture non-monotonicity enables this paper to investigate whether
the household and community level schooling externalities switch signs across the dis-
tributions of household and community level schooling. It thus, for example, allows the
demonstration of directional di¤erences in the externality e¤ects between households and
communities with low or no schooling and those with high levels of schooling.
3.2 Model specication tests
To ensure that the modeling structure as represented by equations (1) to (5) is valid,
the paper tests a number of hypotheses sequentially using the Wald test (hypotheses 1-5,
and 7-10), and a third-moment test developed by Coelli (1995) (hypothesis 6). The third
moment test is a skewness test, and seeks to determine if ordinary least squares residuals
are signicantly negatively skewed by using the standard normal distribution.
1. H0 : fk = k = k = 0 (for all k and f), the null hypothesis means that the
production function is Cobb-Douglas against the alternative that it is Translog.
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2. H0 : k = fk =  = k =  = k = m =  = 0 (for all k; f; and m), this null
hypothesis means that all variables included in the frontier production function are
jointly insignicant.
3. H0 :  = m = 0 (for all m), the null hypothesis species that environmental
conditions (i.e. soil quality and agro-ecological zone xed e¤ects) do not a¤ect
production.
4. H0 :
P5
f=1
P5
k=1 fk +
P5
k=1 k +
P5
k=1 k = 0 and +  +
P5
k=1 k = 1 , the null
hypothesis means that there are constant returns to scale.
5. H0 :  =  = k = k = 0 (for all k ), the null hypothesis means that the direct
externality e¤ect of education is zero i.e. the production based externality model
specication is inappropriate.
6. H0 :  = 0 = 2u = 0; the null hypothesis implies that there is no ine¢ ciency
component. If the null hypothesis is true, then the truncated-normal model reduces
to a linear regression model with normally distributed errors.
7. H0 : w = b =  = 0, the null hypothesis species that the included exogenous
determinants of technical ine¢ ciency are jointly insignicant. A rejection of this
null implies that the the included exogenous factors together inuence technical
ine¢ ciencies.
8. H0 : w = b = 0, the null hypothesis means that the indirect externality e¤ect of
education is zero i.e. the ine¢ ciency based externality model specication is invalid.
9. H0 : w = b =  = 0, the null hypothesis species that the technical ine¢ ciency
e¤ects are homoscedastic. Failure to reject this null implies that the variance of tech-
nical ine¢ ciencies cannot be parameterized to capture determinants of production
uncertainty.
10. H0 : w = b = 0, the null hypothesis species that there are education externalities
in production uncertainty.
3.3 Data and descriptives
The data used in the paper come from the Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3). It is
statistically designed to be representative at national, district, urban and rural levels. The
survey was conducted by the National Statistical O¢ ce from March 2010 to March 2011.
The survey collected information from a sample of 12271 households; 2233 (representing
18.2%) are urban households, and 10038 (representing 81.8%) are rural households. A
total of 768 communities (clusters) were selected across the country. In each district,
12
a minimum of 24 communities were interviewed while in each community a total of 16
households were interviewed. The survey collected socio-economic data at the household
level and on individuals within the households. It also collected data on farming activ-
ities including crop output, land, labour and other inputs. This paper focuses on rural
households as they are more involved in maize production. After data cleaning, I end up
with non-missing maize production data for 11777 elds belonging to 8531 households in
624 rural communities. Since all elds are nested in households and communities, this
feature of the data enables the paper to examine the internal (within the household) and
external (outside the household) e¤ect of schooling on maize production e¢ ciency and
uncertainty.
Some of the maize elds are mixed stand elds with more than one crop planted in a
season. Since most inputs (land, fertilizer and labor) are at the eld level, and cannot be
uniquely assigned to maize production only, I follow Liu & Myers (2009), and generate a
maize output index. The dependent variable, maize yield, is therefore measured as follows
qijl =
( P
m pmqijlm
p1
if intercropped eld
qijl1 if monocropped eld
(10)
where qijl is the maize output index, pm is the market price of crop m, qijlm is the
yield of crop m in eld i for household j in community l, and crop 1 is maize. Thus, for
monocropped elds, maize yield is simply the actual yield. In addition to the independent
variables already discussed, the following variables are used included. I control for the age
of the farmer measured in years. A farmer is dened as a household member who makes
decisions concerning crops to be planted, input use and the timing of cropping activities
on a eld. The focus on the farmer rather than the household head is motivated by Udry
(1996) who nds that in a context where many plots are controlled by di¤erent members
of the household the assumption that resource allocation within the household.is pareto
e¢ cient does not hold. In other words the unitary household model is inappropriate as
households members compete as well as cooperate. Age proxies for experiences which are
helpful in improving production e¢ ciency. According to Coelli & Battese (1996) older
farmers are likely to have more farming experience and hence be less technically ine¢ cient.
I capture gender e¤ects by including a dummy variable for sex of the principal farmer
dened as one for male and zero for female. Female farmers tend to have a lower e¢ ciency
level and higher uncertainty of e¢ ciency (Liu & Myers, 2009). One possible explanation
for this is that female farmers do not have the same inheritance rights as males, and this
reduces the incentive to work hard.
Secure land tenure may lead to more investment such as soil conservation and tree
planting (see for example Deininger & Jin (2006)), and this may increase farm produc-
tivity. I capture security of land tenure by including a dummy variable which is one if
the land for maize is owned by a household and zero if not. A land is considered owned
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if it was inherited or was purchased with a title deed. Binar et al. (2007) notes that
agricultural extension services may speed up the di¤usion process and the adoption of
new varieties and technologies as well as leading to the e¢ cient utilization of existing
technologies by improving farmersknow-how. I therefore control for the e¤ect of exten-
sion services by including a dummy variable which is equal to one if the household was
visited by an extension agent during the growing season, and zero if not.
As has been found by Asadullah & Rahman (2009), underdeveloped infrastructure
can have negative e¤ects on e¢ ciency because farmers may not have the required inputs to
use at the correct time, or not at all. I include a community level economic infrastructure
index to measure availability of and access to economic infrastructure in a community.
The infrastructure index is constructed by using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA)
(see e.g. Asselin (2002) and Blasius and Greenacre (2006) for more details). The economic
infrastructure index is based on the presence of the following in a community: a perennial
and passable main road, a daily market, a weekly market, a post o¢ ce, a commercial bank,
and a micronance institution.
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the study. Land holdings
are small with the average land of 2.5 acres. Levels of schooling are also low; the average
years of schooling is about 3.5 years within households, and 3.4 years at the community
level. These years of schooling correspond to junior primary education. The averages
of maximum years of schooling are 6.9 and 7.9 years at the household and community
levels respectively. These years of schooling are equivalent to senior primary education in
Malawi. The table also shows that 72% of the farmers are male, and the average age of the
farmers is about 43 years. Land tenure security is high, with 77% of the households saying
they own the land they use for growing maize. The penetration of extension services is
low; only 27% of the households said they were visited by an extension agent during the
cropping season.
4 Results
4.1 Model specication results
In order to examine the validity of the modeling assumptions made in this paper, a num-
ber of model specication tests are conducted, and the results are reported in Table 3.
The Wald test results indicate that the stochastic Translog production function is the
appropriate function for the data. All the variables included in the Translog production
frontier are jointly statistically signicant, and that there are statistically signicant en-
vironmental conditions. The inclusion of the two education variables in the production
function is justied, implying that an e¢ ciency-based formulation is not appropriate for
the data. The third-moment test results lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis of
14
no ine¢ ciency component, and this means that technical ine¢ ciency e¤ects are present.
Given the presence of the technical ine¢ ciency e¤ect, the mean of the ine¢ ciency term
can be modeled as a linear function of a set of covariates.
The Wald test results indicate that the determinants of ine¢ ciency included in the
technical ine¢ ciency model are jointly signicant. The education variables are also jointly
signicant in the ine¢ ciency model; this suggests that a production-based formulation
is not appropriate for the data at hand. All this means that a nonneutral Translog
production function which integrates education in both the production and ine¢ ciency
components is the correct specication. Finally, Wald test results show that the technical
ine¢ ciency e¤ects are heteroscedastic; and this implies that the estimation of a production
uncertainty model is justied. I now turn to a discussion of the results for the production
frontier, technical ine¢ ciency and production uncertainty models.
4.2 Econometric results
The Translog production frontier results are reported in Table 4. They indicate that the
Translog production frontier is well-behaved in that it satises all regularity conditions
namely; positive and diminishing marginal products. Additionally, all the ve inputs
have statistically signicant e¤ects on output. Using the estimated coe¢ cients, I compute
average output elasticities with respect to the inputs3. The results are reported in Table
5. Maize seeds as an input have the smallest e¤ect on maize output; fertilizer on the other
hand has the largest e¤ect on maize output. The output elasticity of fertilizer implies that
a 1% increase in fertilizer increases maize production by 0.35%. As mentioned earlier, the
government of Malawi has been implementing a farm input subsidy programme (FISP)
since the 2005/6 growing season. FISP provides provide low-cost fertilizer and improved
maize seeds to poor smallholders. The frontier results o¤er some interesting insights on
how the FISP can be altered to increase maize productivity. The combined e¤ect on
maize output of a 1% increase in seed and fertilizer is 0.42% while the combined e¤ect
on maize output of a 1% increase in land and fertilizer is 0.57%. This means that a
land redistribution exercise which is implemented together with a fertilizer subsidy would
have a 1.4 times larger e¤ect on maize production that the current practice under FISP.
The sum of the output elasticities of all the conventional inputs, a measure of returns to
scale is about 0.86, suggesting that maize production in rural Malawi exhibits decreasing
returns to scale. The Wald test (see Table 3) also conrms that indeed there are no
constant returns to scale. This result is in conformity with ndings by Weir & Knight
(2007) and Asadullah & Rahman (2009) who found evidence of decreasing returns to scale
in cereal production by Ethiopian and Bangladesh farmers, respectively.
3The average output elasticities as calculated using the the following formula n 1
P @ ln qijl
@ ln xijlk
=
n 1
Ph
k + kk lnxijlk +
1
2
P5
f=1 f lnxijlf +
1
2
P5
k=1 ksjl +
1
2
P5
k=1 k~sl
i
where n is the sample size.
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of the Battese and Coelli e¢ ciency estimates for the
sample. The e¢ ciency scores are skewed to the left implying that few maize farmers are
ine¢ cient. Average technical e¢ ciency is estimated to be at 0.68. The average technical
e¢ ciency of 0.68 means that maize production in rural Malawi can be increased by 32%
by simply improving technical e¢ ciency alone without increasing input usage. The most
e¢ cient maize eld has a technical e¢ ciency of 0.99 while the least e¢ cient has a tech-
nical e¢ ciency of 0.00. I now turn to the interpretation of the control variables included
in the e¢ ciency and production uncertainty results. Table 6 shows marginal e¤ects for
the ine¢ ciency (i.e marginal e¤ects on E (uijljO) and production uncertainty models (i.e
marginal e¤ects on V (uijljO). For the technical ine¢ ciency model, positive marginal ef-
fects indicate relative technical ine¢ ciency while negative marginal e¤ects suggest relative
technical e¢ ciency. For the production uncertainty results, positive marginal e¤ects imply
an increase in uncertainty while the reverse holds when the marginal e¤ects are negative.
The magnitude of the marginal e¤ects indicate the strength of this ine¢ ciency and pro-
duction uncertainty. All the ve control variables are statistically signicant in the two
models. The results are generally in conformity with a priori expectations and previous
literature. Interestingly, the marginal e¤ects on ine¢ ciency and production uncertainty
seem to be qualitatively similar.
An interesting pattern for all the variables which is consistent with Bera & Sharma
(1999), and Wang (2002) is that when a farmer moves toward the production frontier
by having higher e¢ ciency, it also reduces production uncertainty at the same time.
Relative to female farmers, the results indicate that male farmers are more e¢ cient, and
they have lower production uncertainty. This result is similar to and consistent with the
ndings of Liu & Myers (2009). The results suggest that other things being equal, an
older farmer is likely to achieve higher and more stable maize output. Since the marginal
e¤ects are also the semi-elasticities of output and output variance; holding other things
constant, an increase in a farmers age on average leads to a 0.04% increase in maize
output, and a 0.9% increase in the stability of maize production. These e¤ects though
statistically signicant, are clearly economically insignicant. The negative relationship
between age and e¢ ciency conforms to an assertion by Coelli & Battese (1996) that
older farmers are likely to be more e¢ cient because they have more farming experience.
In contrast to the nding of this paper, Wang (2002) nds that older farmers have less
stable output. Secure land is benecial as it leads to higher e¢ ciency and more stable
maize production. These ndings could possibly be due to the fact that secure land tenure
may lead to more investment in soil conservation and tree planting which may lead to
high and more stable production. Consistent with Binar et al. (2007), the paper also
nds that extension services lead to higher e¢ ciency. Additionally, farmers who were
visited by extension agents have more stable maize output. In keeping with a nding by
Asadullah & Rahman (2009), the results indicate availability of economic infrastructure
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in a community improves maize farm e¢ ciency. Further to this, the results also show that
the presence of economic infrastructure in a community reduces maize output instability.
I now turn to the main focus of this paper, and discuss results on the existence, nature
and form of intrahousehold and interhousehold externalities of education. The existence
of within and between household education externalities is examined by decomposing
their total e¤ects into a direct e¤ect which works through the production function and an
indirect e¤ects which works as a factor narrowing the technology gap in the ine¢ ciency
model. The direct e¤ect of education is composed of a main e¤ect and an interaction e¤ect.
Results for the main e¤ects show that average years of education at the household and
community levels have positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on maize production.
The coe¢ cients on the interactions are reported in 4. The results indicate that only
fertilizer and seeds have statistically signicant and positive interaction e¤ects with both
average years of schooling in a household and in a community. This means that education
externalities are complementary to fertilizer and seeds; that is, the e¤ect of fertilizer
and seeds on maize production is reinforced by education externalities. The signicant
e¤ect between education and e¤ectiveness of fertilizer is consistent with a similar result
by Foltz et al. (2012). These results point the existence of both intrahousehold and
interhousehold education externalities in maize production in the sense that farmers who
live in households or communities where some members are educated use fertilizer and
maize seeds more e¤ectively.
To get a better understanding of the total e¤ect of education, I now look at the
decomposition results for the two education variables. The results in Table 7 show that
the direct, indirect and total e¤ects of within and between household schooling on farm
output are statistically signicant and positive. This implies that there are intrahouse-
hold and interhousehold externalities of education on maize production (i.e. using an
integrated view of productivity and technical e¢ ciency) in rural Malawi. The results also
show that there are statistically signicant positive education externalities on production
uncertainty. All these education externalities are not only statistically signicant but they
are also quantitatively large. A closer look at the decomposed externality e¤ects indicates
that the direct e¤ect is larger than the indirect e¤ect. This means the intrahousehold and
interhousehold education externalities are stronger in increasing productivity than in re-
ducing ine¢ ciency. Consequently, the e¤ect of education on maize production would have
been severely underestimated if only the e¢ ciency-based specication had been used.
The results indicate that the positive total spillover e¤ect of schooling within a house-
hold on both production, and production uncertainty is larger than the positive exter-
nality e¤ect of schooling at the community level. Since the marginal e¤ects are also
semi-elasticities of output; ceteris paribus, an additional year of schooling within a house-
hold translates into an increase in output of 9.4%, and one more year of schooling at the
community level leads to an increase in output of 6.4%. The di¤erence in the two total
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externality e¤ects on production is statistically signicant with a t-statistic (p-value) of
44.5 (0.00). In terms of production uncertainty, holding other things constant, a unit
increase in average schooling within a household leads to a 11% increase in the output
variance, and a unit increase in community level average schooling leads to an increase
in the output variance of 0.9%. This di¤erence is also statistically signicant with a
t-statistic (p-value) of -166.4 (0.00).
How robust is the evidence of the existence of intrahousehold and interhousehold ex-
ternalities of education to the way schooling is captured? The above results are based
on the average years of schooling within and between households. It can be argued that
the externality of schooling can best be captured by the highest level of education among
all household or all community members. The one who receives the highest education in
the household or at the community can help other household and community members
in making production decisions. I therefore re-estimated the above models, and replaced
household average years of schooling with the maximum years of schooling in a household,
and average years of schooling in a community with the maximum of years of schooling
in a community. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones seen before. Speci-
cally, I nd statistically and economically signicant intrahousehold and interhousehold
externalities of education. The total partial e¤ects (standard errors) of maximum years of
schooling in a household on production and production uncertainty are 0.0524(0.0001) and
-0.0485 (0.0002) respectively. Further to this, the total partial e¤ects (standard errors) of
maximum years of schooling in a community on ine¢ ciency and production uncertainty
are 0.0228 (0.0001) and -0.0072 (0.0004) respectively4. Thus, the pattern observed earlier
that the intrahousehold externality e¤ects are larger than the interhousehold externality
e¤ects remains unchanged even when this new denition is adopted. All this implies that
the nding that there are positive education spillovers is not sensitive to how schooling
is measured. The rest of the analysis is therefore based on average years of schooling at
the household and community levels.
Do farmers who reside in households where there is little or no education benet more
from living in communities where some inhabitants are educated? I answer this question
by looking at how the interhousehold externality e¤ect varies across di¤erent quartiles of
household level schooling. It is possible to estimate quartile-specic total partial e¤ects
because the partial e¤ects are observation-specic. The results are reported in Table 8.
On production, the results indicate that the total externality e¤ect of community level
schooling is highest for households where members have no or little education while it
is smallest for households with highly educated members. Specically, the interhouse-
hold externality e¤ect in the rst household schooling-quartile (i.e. the least educated
households) is 0.1297. This e¤ect translates into an increase in maize output of 13%.
On the other hand, for households in the last household schooling-quartile, the inter-
4A complete set of results is available from the author upon request.
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household externality e¤ect is 0.02; implying that maize output increases by 2%. The
interhousehold externality e¤ects for all the quartiles are both statistically and economi-
cally signicant. Turning to production uncertainty, a similar pattern is observed. The
total e¤ects of community level schooling are -0.1335 and -0.0917 for the rst and last
quartiles of household schooling respectively. This means that, ceteris paribus, the maize
output variance decreases by 13.4% and 9.2% for farmers in the least educated and most
educated households respectively. These results suggest that in terms of both production
and production stability of maize production, community level schooling substitutes for
household level schooling in the sense that farmers who reside in households where mem-
bers are not educated benet more from living in communities where some inhabitants
are educated.
Do less e¢ cient farmers benet more from household and community level school-
ing? Similar to the preceding analysis, I estimate the intrahousehold and interhousehold
education externalities for di¤erent quartiles of estimated e¢ ciency. The results of this
analysis are reported in Table 9. All the total partial e¤ects for the di¤erent quartiles
are both statistically signicant and quantitatively large. There is a decreasing trend of
both the intrahousehold and interhousehold education externality e¤ect on production
and production uncertainty from low to high quartiles of e¢ ciency. Looking at the re-
lationship between average household schooling and maize production, the total e¤ects
are 0.1669 and 0.1443 for the rst quartile and last quartiles respectively. This implies
that an additional year of education at the household level leads to an increase in maize
output of 16.7% and 14.4% for the least e¢ cient and most e¢ cient farmers respectively.
The total interhousehold externality e¤ect on e¢ ciency in the rst quartile is 0.0684 and
it is 0.0596 in the last quartile; suggesting that holding other things constant, farmers
in the rst and last quartiles experience an increase in maize output of 6.8% and 6.0%
on account of an additional year of schooling in the community. This means that maize
farmers with lower e¢ ciency levels benet more from increased education within and be-
tween households than the ones with higher e¢ ciency levels. In keeping with a pattern
observed earlier, the results also show that the intrahousehold externality e¤ect on pro-
duction and production uncertainty is larger than the interhousehold externality across
all quartiles.
The nal problem addressed in this paper concerns whether or not the education
externalities vary with level of schooling. Put di¤erently, do the education externalities
remain the same both in terms of sign and magnitude no matter the level of schooling?
Evidence of nonlinearities would suggest that the externalities have a turning point. I
divide the average years of schooling at the household and community levels into quartiles,
I then use box plots of the estimated marginal e¤ects of the average years of schooling
across the four quartiles. Figures 3 and 4 show the box plots which capture the evolution of
intrahousehold and interhousehold externality total e¤ects on production and production
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uncertainty across the quartiles. The total partial e¤ects do not switch signs across
the quartiles, implying the intrahousehold and interhousehold education externalities are
monotonic. The results also show a negative but declining trend in the magnitudes of
the externality e¤ects as one moves from the rst quartile to the last quartile, which
means that education is most valuable with respect to increasing maize production, and
production uncertainty when schooling is relatively low, and the benet is smaller at the
higher education level.
5 Conclusion and policy implications
The paper has looked at the existence, nature and form of intrahousehold and interhouse-
hold externalities of education on productivity, e¢ ciency, and production uncertainty of
maize in rural Malawi. Data from the Third Integrated Household Survey are used. The
results indicate that there are statistically and economically signicant positive intra-
household and interhousehold externalities of education on productivity, e¢ ciency, and
production uncertainty. These e¤ects are insensitive to how schooling is captured; the
results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar whether the externalities are measured
using average years of schooling or maximum years of schooling. It has been found that
the intrahousehold externality e¤ects are larger than the interhousehold externality ef-
fects. The paper has found that community level schooling substitutes for household
level schooling in the sense that farmers who reside in households where members are not
educated have relatively higher productivity and e¢ ciency, and lower production uncer-
tainty on account of living in communities where some inhabitants are educated. The
intrahousehold and interhousehold externality e¤ect of education is more pronounced for
the least e¢ cient farmers. The education externalities are found to be monotonic, and
largest when schooling is relatively low.
Malawi like other developing countries is largely agrobased, with the majority of the
population, especially the rural population, nding their livelihood in agriculture. The
proportion of the population in wage employment is low. For instance, NSO (2012b) nds
that only 13.4% of the labour force in Malawi in 2011 was in regular wage employment.
Hence, the returns to education in the labour market though important are not very
useful as a guide on public investment in education. In this context, returns to education
in agriculture would be relevant. Further to this, and as pointed out earlier, the MGDS
despite identifying strategies to increase maize productivity does not explicitly recognise
the role that education can play in increasing maize productivity. The results in this
paper underline the fact that education can play an important role in increasing maize
productivity as well as ensuring that production risk or uncertainty is reduced. Crucially,
the ndings imply that farmers who are uneducated are not necessarily worse-o¤ in maize
production as they benet from living in households or communities where some members
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are educated. The existence of social benets arising from educating individual members
of a society emphasises the fact that evaluation of the costs and benets of investments in
education should take into account the social returns; failure to do so may underestimate
the benets of education and lead to its underprovision.
The nding that the education externalities on maize production are most pro-
nounced when schooling is low, further suggests that to increase production, investments
in education should focus more on primary education. This is consistent with a large
literature on social and private rates of return to education in developing countries which
show that returns to primary education are high, relative to a discount rate and to returns
to higher levels of education (Psacharopoulos, 1994; Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002).
Besides, the implication of the results to focus more on primary education o¤ers some
justication for the provision of free primary education in Malawi, and the magnitude of
the intrahousehold and interhousehold externalities of education is a useful indicator of
the productivity of this public investment in education.
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Figure 1. Evolution of maize yield, area harvested and production 2000-2012
Source: Author’s computation using FAOSTAT database
Table 1. Trends and levels of some education statistics, 2004-2011
Indicator Malawi Rural Urban
2004 2011 2004 2011 2004 2011
Adult literacy 63.9 65.4 60.9 60.7 85.6 89.0
Net primary enrolment rate 80.0 85.8 79.3 84.6 86.8 92.7
Gross primary enrolment rate 112.9 120.0 112.0 119.2 122.4 125.1
Primary dropout rate 5.1 1.3 5.3 1.4 4.1 0.9
Source: NSO (2005, 2012b)
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD
log of  yield 6.396 1.205
log of seed 1.836 1.509
log of land -0.091 0.783
log of fertilizer 4.208 0.712
log of labour 3.402 0.510
log of capital 6.567 1.112
zone1: Nsanje, Chikwawa districts 0.004 0.062
zone2: Blantyre, Zomba, Thyolo, Mulanje, Chiradzulu, Phalombe districts 0.172 0.378
zone3: Mwanza, Balaka, Machinga, Mangochi districts 0.124 0.330
zone4: Dedza, Dowa, Ntchisi districts 0.159 0.366
zone5: Lilongwe, Mchinji, Kasungu districts 0.203 0.402
zone6: Ntcheu, Salima, Nkhotakota districts 0.130 0.337
zone7: Mzimba, Rumphi, Chitipa districts 0.157 0.364
zone8: Nkhatabay, Karonga districts 0.051 0.219
average years of schooling in a household 3.822 2.268
average years of schooling in a community 3.576 1.071
maximum years of schooling in a household 7.496 3.330
maximum years of schooling in a community 8.056 2.206
male principal farmer 0.757 0.429
age of principal farmer 43.019 15.989
household visited by extension agent 0.290 0.454
land owned by household 0.770 0.421
Observations 4860
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Table 3. Model specication tests
No.Hypothesis Wald /Z
statistic
DF P-value Conclusion
1 0:0 === kkfkH lhb 611.85 30 0.00 Translog is appropriate
2 0:0 ======== pdlghfbb mkkfkkH 1926.47 42 0.00 Frontier variables jointly
significant
3 0:0 == mH dp 358.09 9 0.00 Significant environmental
conditions
4 0: 5 15 15 15 10 =å+å+åå ==== kkkkfkkfH lhb
and 15 1 =å++ = kk bgf
22.17 2 0.00 No constant returns to scale
5 0:0 ==== kkH lhgf 72.77 14 There is a direct externality
effect of education
6 H0 : W = 0 = au2 = 0 -19.58 a - 0.00 Inefficiency effects arepresent
7 0:0 === aaa bwH 34.71 7 0.00 Efficiency variables jointly
significant
8 0:0 == bwH aa 51.87 2 0.00 There is an indirect
externality effect of
education
9 0:0 === qqq bwH 25.14 7 0.00 Heteroscedastic model is
valid
10 0:0 == bwH qq 69.22 7 0.00 Education externalities in
production uncertainty
a This is based on the standard normal statistic. DF is degrees of freedom.
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Table 4. Translog production function results
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
Sb 0.1255
**
ACb 0.0006 sFh -0.0014
(0.0549) (0.0118) (0.0024)
Ab 0.3415
***
FFb 0.0494
***
sLh -0.0181
(0.1032) (0.0042) (0.0882)
Fb 0.0492
***
FLb -0.0131 sCh -0.0833
(0.0084) (0.0103) (0.0045)
Lb 0.1374
***
FCb -0.0030 Ss~h 0.107
*
(0.0231) (0.0341) (0.0067)
Cb 0.2134
***
LLb 0.0527
***
As~h -0.0310
(0.0760) (0.0198) (0.0834)
SSb -0.0220
***
LCb -0.0156 Fs~h 0.0640
***
(0.0019) (0.0177) (0.0050)
SAb -0.0174
**
CCb 0.0023 Ls~h 0.0012
(0.0082) (0.0036) (0.0193)
SFb 0.0048 SAd -0.0928
***
cs~h -0.0150
(0.0036) (0.0219) (0.0097)
SLb -0.0130 CLAd 0.0079
(0.0121) (0.0237)
SCb 0.0032 f 0.1495
***
(0.0056) (0.0404)
AAb -0.0287
*** g 0.0125***
(0.0054) (0.0019)
AFb 0.0058 sSh 0.0518
***
(0.0071) (0.0031)
ALb 0.0190 sAh -0.0022
(0.0218) (0.0064)
0b 3.2432
***
(0.4950)
Chi2 9753.91
Observations 11777
S refers to seed , A to land, L to labor, F to fertilizer, C to capital, SA to sandy soil, CLA to clay, s to average
schooling in a household, s~ to average schooling in a community. Coefficients for agro-ecological zones have been
left out to conserve space. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5. Output elasticities from the Translog model
Input Elasticity
seed 0.0683***
(0.0003)
land 0.2147***
(0.0012)
labour 0.0977***
(0.0008)
fertilizer 0.3535***
(0.0005)
capital 0.1272***
(0.0002)
Returns to scale 0.8614
N 11777
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Figure 2. Kernel density estimate of technical e¢ ciency estimates
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Table 6. Marginal e¤ects of control variables on ine¢ ciency
Variable Inefficiency Uncertainty
male farmer -0.0765*** -0.0886***
(0.0004) (0.0008)
age of farmer -0.0004*** -0.0009***
(0.0002) (0.0001)
land owned by household -0.0223*** -0.0259***
(0.0001) (0.0003)
household visited by extension agent -0.0486*** -0.0552***
(0.0001) (0.0003)
index of economic infrastructure -0.0078*** -0.0120***
(0.0004) (0.0008)
Observations 11777 11777
Bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 7. Total partial e¤ects of education
Variable Indirect effect Direct effect Total effect
Effect on production and inefficiency of:
average years of schooling in a household -0.0271*** 0.0664*** 0.0935***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
average years of schooling in a community -0.0081*** 0.0559*** 0.0640***
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Effect on uncertainty of:
average years of schooling in a household -0.1102***
(0.0006)
average years of schooling in a community -0.0090***
(0.0001)
Observations 11777 11777 11777
The total effect on production and inefficiency is calculated as: total effect=direct effect-indirect effect.
Bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 8. Total partial e¤ects over quartiles of average household schooling
Variable Quartiles
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100
production and inefficiency
average years of schooling in a
community
0.1297*** 0.0571*** 0.0509*** 0.0200***
(0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Uncertainty
average years of schooling in a
community
-0.1335*** -0.1146*** -0.1007*** -0.0917***
(0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Observations 2950 2945 2995 2887
Bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 9. Total partial e¤ects over quartiles of Battese and Coelli e¢ ciency estimates
Variable Quartiles
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100
production and inefficiency
average years of schooling in a
household
0.1669*** 0.1611*** 0.1610*** 0.1443***
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007)
average years of schooling in a
community
0.0684*** 0.0653*** 0.0628*** 0.0596***
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Uncertainty
average years of schooling in a
household
-0.1325*** -0.1148*** -0.1029*** -0.0907***
(0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)
average years of schooling in a
community
-0.0101*** -0.0093*** -0.0086*** -0.0079***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 2945 2944 2944 2944
Bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Figure 3. Externality e¤ect over quartiles of household average years of schooling
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Figure 4. Externality e¤ect over quartiles of community average years of schooling
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